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WHY ONLY THE STATE MAY INFLICT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Abstract: Some theorists argue that a justification of criminal punishment
presupposes a theory of state power. Although the state is typically
assigned the task of inflicting criminal sanctions, the mere fact that the
criminal deserves to be punished cannot in itself justify the infliction of
punishment by the state, as non-state agents could presumably give people
their just deserts.
One way of addressing the plea for a theory of state power would be to
suggest that state-inflicted sanctions are justified simply on the grounds
that the state is more likely than other agents to determine accurately what
a wrongdoer justly deserves and to inflict a just sanction on those who
deserve it. Hence, the state's role in inflicting criminal sanctions is
contingent and, in principle, the state could be replaced by other agents,
e.g., private individuals. This hypothesis has given rise to recent calls to
reform the state's criminal justice system by introducing privately-inflicted
sanctions, e.g., shaming penalties, private prisons or private probationary
services.
This paper challenges this view and argues that the agency of the state is
indispensable to criminal sanctions in a way that renders the idea of
replacing state-inflicted sanctions with privately inflicted sanctions not
merely contingently undesirable. Privately-inflicted sanctions sever the
link between state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the action
and the appropriateness of the sanction and the infliction of sufferings on
the criminal. When a private individual inflicts punishment she acts on
what she and not the state judges to be a sufficient basis for action.
Privately-inflicted sanctions for violations of criminal laws are not
grounded in the judgments of the appropriate agent, namely the state. It is
impermissible on the part of the state to approve a sanction inflicted on an
alleged wrongdoer on the basis of such a private judgment. Such an
approval grants undue weight to the private judgment of the individual
who inflicts the sanction.
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WHY ONLY THE STATE MAY INFLICT CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS
By Alon Harel*

I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal sanctions are typically administered by the state. Both the
determination of the severity of the criminal sanctions and the actual
infliction of the sanctions are typically carried out by the state (via its
public officials). Recent developments in the criminal law system are
designed to shift some of these powers from the state to individual citizens
(or other private entities). Shaming penalties are one paradigmatic
example of a shift in the power to determine the severity of sanctions as
well as the power to inflict sanctions from the state to private citizens.1
Privately run, for-profit prisons are another example, but here only the
power to inflict criminal sanctions is transferred from the state to
corporate bodies. The victims’ rights movement also proposes to shift
some of the powers to punish from the state to the victims of crime. A less
well-known example of privately-inflicted sanctions is the recent initiative
to privatize the probationary system in Britain.2 These developments have
been thoroughly analyzed by lawyers, economists and sociologists. This
paper provides a philosophical perspective on privately-inflicted sanctions.
In this paper I will argue that the recent initiatives to privatize criminal
law fail to appreciate the intimate relations between the state and criminal
*

Alon Harel is the Phillio P. Mizock & Estelle Mizock Chair in Administrative and
Criminal law at Hebrew University.
1

For contemporary advocates of shaming sanctions, see Dan Kahan, What do Alternative
Sanctions Mean? 63 Chicago Law Review 591-653 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, & Eric A.
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines 42 Journal of Law and Economics 365-391 (1999). In a recent
article, Dan Kahan expresses reservations concerning his earlier advocacy of shaming
penalties. See Dan Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions 84 Texas L.
Rev. 2075 (2006).
2

See Offender Management Bill
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmbills/009/2007009.pdf).
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sanctioning, and that “privatizing” the infliction of criminal sanctions
undermines the very foundations of the criminal law system. To the extent
that the state issues criminal prohibitions, it should determine the nature
and the severity of the sanctions that follow their violation and should
itself inflict these sanctions. Criminal prohibitions, it will be argued, are
grounded in the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act.
Delegating the power to determine the nature and severity of the criminal
sanctions (e.g., by using shaming penalties) or delegating the power to
inflict criminal sanctions to private entities (e.g., by establishing private
prisons) severs the link between the state’s judgments concerning the
wrongfulness of the act and the determination of the severity of the
sanction or the infliction of the sanction. This link, it will be argued, is
indispensable and it is impermissible on the part of the state to authorize
the infliction of sanctions in the absence of such a link.
In the Grammar of Criminal Law, George Fletcher defends the view that
there is an intimate relation between criminal law and the state:
The distinction between political and moral theory is critical to
the argument. Some writers today use the term 'moral' so
broadly that their usage obfuscates the important distinction
between the state's acting legitimately and individuals acting
morally. The political addresses the power and prerogatives of
state officials—that is, of human beings cast into a particular
role of enforcing criminal prohibitions. The moral focuses
primarily on the lives of individuals, both in their personal
flourishing and in their relationships with other individuals.
An example of the kind of the argument I seek to avoid is the
conventional claim about desert. The argument goes like this.
Some people – really bad people like Adolph Eichmann or
Slobodan Milosevic-deserve to be punished. Because they
deserve a certain consequence, it follows that the state is
justified in delivering it. This is a non sequitur….Missing are
the critical premises first that is the business of the state rather
than of God (or the victim or the victim's family) to punish the
offender…Just because the offender might deserve
punishment, it does not follow – without an appropriate theory
of state power—that the state should assess the degree of
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deserved punishment and use its power to impose it on the
offender. The quick assumption that the state is entitled to
punish offenders who ‘deserve’ it is one of the unfortunate
banalities of criminal law in our time.3
Fletcher believes that only a theory of the state can provide an adequate
explanation of why criminal sanctions should be inflicted by the state. A
theory of criminal law must be able to explain why the state (rather than
other agents) is in charge of inflicting sanctions. Moral theorists in general
and desert theorists in particular, Fletcher argues, do not meet this test and
thus fail to justify the existence of a state-inflicted scheme of criminal
sanctions.
This conclusion, however, is too hasty. The fact that criminal sanctions
happen to be state-inflicted does not imply that a justification for inflicting
criminal sanctions presuppose a theory of the state. Arguably the political
legitimacy of the state rests on its success in inducing moral behavior on
the part of individuals. The success of the state in inducing moral behavior
could be regarded as a sufficient justification for assigning the power to
inflict sanctions to the state. If this is the case, no theory of state power is
necessary, since criminal sanctions for wrongdoing do not have to be
inflicted by the state. It is merely a coincidence that the state happens
(sometimes or even often) to be the agent that is the most capable of
inflicting sanctions. Consequently, criminal sanctions should be inflicted
by private individuals when these individuals are better placed or can
more effectively inflict them.
Theorists who uphold the view that criminal law could be justified without
reference to the agency of the state can thus easily address Fletcher's call
for a justification of state-inflicted criminal sanctions. On this view,
criminal sanctions should be administered by the institution that is the
most likely to determine accurately what wrongdoers justly deserve and to
inflict the just punishment successfully (or efficiently). The rationale
underlying criminal sanctions (and the criteria for determining the severity
of the sanction) can thus be fully accounted for without reference to the
3

George Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative and
International vol. 1 pp. 226-7 (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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agent who is assigned the task of inflicting them. Once the rationale for
inflicting sanctions has been identified, the theorist should seek the agent
who is most likely to succeed in executing this task. Criminal sanctioning
is therefore ultimately a task in search of an appropriate agent. So, while
Fletcher is right in pointing out that a complete justification of criminal
law requires a justification for a state-inflicted scheme of criminal
sanctions, such a justification is ultimately founded on instrumental or
pragmatic reasons, e.g., the distinctive ability of the state to identify what
just desert is and to inflict it successfully or more efficiently than other
agents. Such a justification sharply separates the question of what the
rationale of criminal punishment and the criteria for determining its
appropriateness are and the question of who the agent in charge of
administering the sanctions should be. The answer to the latter question
can only be answered once the former question concerning the rationale
underlying criminal punishment and the criteria for determining the
appropriate sanction have been addressed.
While Fletcher raises an important challenge to desert theorists, his
analysis fails to investigate whether desert theorists could address this
challenge. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap and establish that the
state is not merely a means for inflicting deserved suffering on criminals.
In fact, I will argue that state-inflicted sanctions are fundamentally
different from privately-inflicted sufferings on the guilty. Under this view,
the replacement of the state with other agents is not merely impractical or
contingently undesirable. Rather, the agency of the state is necessary for
the justified infliction of criminal punishment. Establishing a system of
privately-inflicted criminal sanctions in fact challenges some of the most
fundamental convictions underlying the criminal law system. To the extent
that the state prohibits certain sorts of conduct, it is the state and the state
alone which ought to administer sanctions for the violations of these
prohibitions. A full understanding of the normative justification for
criminal sanctions requires an understanding of the indispensability of the
agency of the state to the legitimacy of the criminal law system.
Section II starts by defining what I mean by “criminal sanctions”,
“privately-inflicted sanctions” and “state-inflicted sanctions.” Then it
differentiates between three types of justifications for state-inflicted
criminal sanctions: instrumental justifications, the normative preconditions
justifications and state-centered justifications. Section III provides
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arguments in favor of an “integrationist” state-centered justification. It
argues that the practice of inflicting sanctions for wrongdoing is an
integral part of other duties and powers that the state has. The
appropriateness of sanctions and their success in achieving their goals
depends on their being integrated into other spheres of the state’s activity.
Most importantly, inflicting criminal sanctions presupposes that the state
forms a judgment with respect to the wrongfulness of the act and the
appropriateness of the sanction. Privately-inflicted sanctions, it will be
argued, do not reflect the state’s judgment concerning the wrongfulness of
the act or the appropriateness of the sanction. The infliction of these
sanctions severs the link between the state’s judgments concerning the
wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness of the sanction or the
infliction of the sanction. Section IV investigates the normative
implications of the “integrationist justification” for the state’s power to
inflict sanctions and argues that the integrationist justification casts doubts
on the legitimacy of some contemporary punitive practices such as
shaming penalties and private prisons.

II. WHY STATE-INFLICTED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS?
Prior to examining the three types of justifications for state-inflicted
criminal sanctions, I will explain what I mean by criminal sanctions and
by state-inflicted and privately-inflicted sanctions.
The fact that one of the characteristic features of criminal sanctions is that
they are administered by the state may generate a suspicion that the stateinflicted nature of criminal sanction is not normatively required for the
justified infliction of these sanctions but simply part of the definition of
criminal sanctions. Thus, privately inflicted sanctions are not illegitimate;
instead they simply ought not to be labeled “criminal”. Rebutting this
suspicion and establishing a normative argument against privatelyinflicted criminal sanctions requires characterizing criminal sanctions in a
way which is independent of the agent who inflicts these sanctions.
Following HLA Hart, I will characterize criminal sanctions as sanctions
which involve “pain or other consequences normally considered
unpleasant” which are inflicted upon “an actual or supposed offender for
his offence” and which must also be imposed for “an offence against legal
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rules”.4 There is however an additional component not explicitly
mentioned by Hart which must be stressed: the nature of the remedy. It is
obvious that not all unpleasant consequences triggered by violation of a
legal rule should be classified as punishment. Tort liability for negligence
per se, based on the violation of a statutory norm, could meet this test.5
Yet tort liability differs from criminal liability in that the remedy is
typically compensatory rather than punitive.
There are of course cases in which the state inflicts pain or other
unpleasant consequences that are not characterized as criminal
punishments. The state deports aliens, expatriates individuals under
extreme circumstances and impeaches presidents for wrongful behavior.6
None of these acts is categorized as a criminal sanction. The arguments
provided below as to why the state rather than private agents ought to have
the power to inflict criminal sanctions may apply to some of these cases
even if they are not traditionally categorized as criminal. However, given
the fact that criminal law is a paradigmatic case involving punitive
measures triggered by violations of state prohibitions, I shall use the term
criminal sanctions to refer to all these punitive measures even if they are
not traditionally classified as criminal.
The distinction between state-inflicted sanctions and privately-inflicted
sanctions also requires some clarification. State-inflicted sanctions are
sanctions administered by state officials in their capacity as state officials.
Privately-inflicted sanctions are inflicted by private entities. The privatelyinflicted sanctions which are the target of my critique are those and only
those sanctions inflicted by individuals (or other private entities) at the
encouragement, or initiative of the state. Thus, it is not claimed here that it
is impermissible for individuals to condemn convicted offenders on the
4

See HLA Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment in Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 1, 4-5 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968).
5

The part of the civil law bearing the strongest resemblance to the criminal law is the
law of tort. Consequently textbooks of criminal law often start by differentiating between
criminal law and tort law. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 25
(London, Stevens & Sons, 2nd ed., 1983)
6

These are the examples provided by George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 412
(Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1978)
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basis of a judgment that criminals are evil, or that they ought to suffer etc.
Instead, what is impermissible is for the state to hand over the infliction of
sanctions to private individuals who inflict the sanctions on its behalf.
One might object here that once the state hands over to an individual or a
private entity the power to inflict a sanction, the sanction thereby becomes
a state-inflicted sanction. From this it would follow that it is conceptually
impossible to inflict a state-approved privately-inflicted sanction. This
objection is based on a misunderstanding. To qualify as a state-inflicted
sanction, the sanction must be inflicted by a state official. An individual
who is called upon “to shame” an offender or a private corporation that is
hired to run a prison does not thereby become an official of the state and,
consequently, the sanctions inflicted by it are privately-inflicted sanctions.
To qualify as a state-inflicted sanction, the agent inflicting it must be an
agent who is morally barred from acting on the basis of its own
independent judgments, e.g., a judge or a prison guard. In contrast, a
private individual who is called upon to shame an offender or a
corporation which is hired to run a prison are private entities and the
sanctions they inflict are therefore privately-inflicted sanctions.
I will now turn to the description of three types of justifications for stateinflicted criminal sanctions. Under the first type of justifications – the
instrumental justifications - the state is the appropriate agent for inflicting
criminal sanctions simply because it is deliberative and impartial. As such,
it is the most qualified to determine what the just (or appropriate)
punishment is and to inflict it on those who deserve it. In principle, the
infliction of criminal sanctions could be performed by other, non-state
agents; and, furthermore, if circumstances change, it is possible that
institutions other than the state should (wholly or in part) replace the state.
Under the second type of justifications – the normative precondition
justifications – the infliction of criminal sanctions by the state achieves
goals which, in principle, could be fully realized through the infliction of
sanctions by private agents. Yet, in contrast to the instrumental
justifications, there are normative constraints that preclude the infliction of
sanctions by agents other than the state. In other words, although the
agency of the state is not essential to the success of criminal sanctions, it is
a non-contingent normative precondition for the just infliction of criminal
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punishment.7 Finally, under the third type of justifications – the statecentered justifications – the power to inflict criminal sanctions is an agentdependent power – a power which can be successfully exercised only by
the state. State-inflicted sanctions are designed to realize goals or perform
tasks which cannot, in principle, be performed successfully by private
institutions or individuals acting on their own. There is a fundamental
difference between state-inflicted criminal punishment and suffering
inflicted on the guilty by other agents. For this reason criminal sanctions
can only be carried out by the state.
This classification shows clearly what the controversy between theories of
punishment involves. Some theories regard the state’s involvement in
punishment as purely instrumental and, consequently, assert that the
agency of the state is not necessary for the justifiability of criminal
sanctions. Other theories perceive the power to punish as inherently
belonging to the state and thus as indispensable for the justifiability of
criminal sanctions.
The first type of justifications – instrumental justifications – is premised
on the idea that punishment serves important societal goals that could in
principle be realized by other non-state agents. However, the state is seen
as more capable or better placed to create the institutions and/or sustain
the practices which guarantee that punishment is imposed in accordance
with the gravity of the offence. A variant of this argument is that stateinflicted sanctions are justified because the state’s costs in establishing the
relevant institutions or sustaining them are lower than that of other agents.
7

Asserting that the agency of the state is a “non-contingent normative precondition for
the just infliction of punishment” raises questions concerning the nature and the strength
of this normative precondition. The normative precondition justification would not
preclude the possibility that there may be circumstances under which non-state agents can
justly inflict criminal sanctions. Yet, the normative preconditions justification maintains
that, under normal conditions, there are central features of the state that make it the only
agent which can inflict criminal sanctions. Radical transformation of the state or of other
agents may open the possibility that other agents would justly inflict criminal sanctions.
The conditions which could justify such a change ought to be more extreme than those
which would justify such a change under the instrumental view. A simple change in the
costs of privately-inflicted sanctions or in the deliberative powers of the state or private
agents would not suffice to justify transferring the power to inflict sanctions from the
state to private agents.
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A well known proponent of the view that the state is better capable of
determining the appropriate severity of sanctions is John Locke who
believed that:
To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature, every
one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not
but it will be objected, That it is unreasonable for Men to be
Judges in their own Cases, that Self-Love will make Men
partial to themselves and their Friends. And on the other side,
that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others. And hence nothing but Confusion and
Disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly
appointed Government to restrain the partiality and violence of
men. I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper
Remedy for the inconveniencies of the State of Nature, which
must certainly be Great, where Men may be judges in their own
Case, since ‘iis easilt to be imagined, that he who was so unjust
as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to
condemn himself for it. 8
According to Locke, the state should be empowered to inflict sanctions on
those who transgress the laws of nature, because the state is less partial
than alternative agents in its treatment of offenders and consequently less
likely to inflict inappropriate sanctions. In contrast, when individuals are
called upon to inflict sanctions on their friends, they are likely to inflict
sanctions that are too light. In other cases, motives of vengeance may
induce individuals to inflict sanctions that are excessive. Interestingly law
and economics scholars often endorse a similar view. In their view,
punishment should be supplied by the state because the infliction of
sanctions involves a collective action problem.9 The individual who
inflicts a sanction has to bear the costs himself whereas the benefits
resulting from the infliction of sanctions (e.g., crime prevention) are

8

See, e.g., John Locke, Two Treaties of Government: Second Treatise section 13
(Cambridge University Press, ed. Peter Laslett, 1960).

9

See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II pp. 9-15 (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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enjoyed by everybody. Consequently, individuals have sub-optimal
incentives to inflict sanctions.10
This brief discussion is sufficient to illustrate that two of the most
influential views concerning punishment, namely, certain influential
versions of retributivism and deterrence theories fall under the category of
instrumental theories. Some (although not all) retributivists argue that
punishment is justified in order “to ensure that wrong-doers receive the
suffering which they deserve.”11 Under this view, “necessarily acts of
certain kinds have an intrinsic property that it is fit, appropriate or ‘called
for’ that the perpetrator suffers for it.”12 But there is no principled reason
why the infliction of deserved suffering needs to be performed by the
state. In fact: “if a wrong-doer suffers some natural calamity – especially
if it is a consequence of her wrong-doing, or resembles the harm she had
done to others – this may be seen… as ‘just what she deserves…’”13 The
same view concerning the role of the state in punishment is shared by
other types of retributivists, for example, those who believe that
punishment expresses punitive emotions such as resentment or
indignation.14 In the view of “punitive emotions” retributivists, “certain
wrongdoers quite properly excite the resentment (anger, hatred) of all
right-thinking people, and the criminal law is a civilized and efficient way
10

This is an argument in favor of the state inflicting the sanction or at least paying for its
infliction but not necessarily determining its size.

11

See R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 198 (Cambridge University Press, 1986).

12

See Thomas E. Hill, Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment 18 Law and
Philosophy 407, 425 (1999)

13

Duff, supra note 11 at 198. For a clarification and defense of the claim that the guilty
deserve to suffer, see Lawrence H. Davis, They Deserve to Suffer 32 Analysis 136-140
(1972). For a very careful articulation of desert theories, see Hill id at 413-414. Hill
distinguishes between a practical or action-guiding desert theories and a merely faith
guiding or wish-expression desert theories. The former argue that perpetrating crimes
provide one a reason to inflict sufferings on the guilty while the latter argue merely that
perpetrating crimes provides one a reason to wish that the guilty suffer. It is clear that a
justification of punishment ought to be based on a strong, i.e., action-guiding desert
theory.

14

See R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community 23-27 (Oxford
University Press, 2001).
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in which such passions may be directed toward their proper objects,
allowing victims to get legitimate revenge consistently with the
maintenance of public order.”15 To the extent that desert-based
retributivists or the “punitive emotions” retributivists insist that it is the
state rather than other agents that should inflict the deserved sufferings, it
is simply because the state is well placed to determine what a person
deserves and to inflict the sanction.
Deterrence theorists believe that deterrence depends on the probability of
detection and the severity of the sanction.16 The agency of the state plays
no essential role in the justification of punishment and consequently there
is no principled reason to believe that non-state agents cannot inflict
sanctions that will deter wrongdoers. In fact, deterrence theorists have
often pointed out that non-state agents may be more effective than state
agents in inflicting sanctions and that such sanctions may be more
effective in deterring crimes.17
To conclude, justifying state-inflicted punishments on the basis of
instrumental justifications requires two argumentative steps. First, one
must establish that, in principle, inflicting sanctions for wrongdoing is
appropriate or desirable. The infliction of sanctions of an appropriate
magnitude fulfills an important role, e.g., the infliction of sufferings on
those who deserve it or deterring or preventing crime. Second, one must
establish that state-inflicted punishments are in fact the most effective
means of inflicting the appropriate sanctions for transgressions. The
criteria for the appropriateness of the sanctions can be based on
considerations of justice, e.g., desert or they can be utilitarian. In both
cases, however, the prospects of success in identifying and inflicting the
15

See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 3-4 (Cambridge
University Press, 1988).

16

See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 76 Journal of
Political Economy 169-217 (1968).

17

Economic advocates of deterrence theories have often argued for the use of "bounty
hunters” to detect crime. See, e.g., Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement
of Fines 9 Journal of Legal Studies 105-127 (1980); Steven Shavell, The Optimal
Structure of Law Enforcement 36 Journal of Law & Economics 255-287 (1993). The
advocates of shaming penalties also share the belief that privately-inflicted sanctions may
be a better way of preventing crime. See references in supra note 1.
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appropriate sanctions or the cost-effectiveness in performing this task (or
other contingent advantages) provide the sole basis for determining who
should have the power to inflict sanctions. Punishment can therefore be
described as a task in search of an agent capable of performing it.
Normative preconditions arguments also maintain that punishment can be
imposed by non-state agents. Furthermore, punishments inflicted by nonstate agents can in principle function in the same ways and be valuable for
the same reasons as state-inflicted sanctions. Nevertheless, the advocates
of normative preconditions justifications maintain that punishment
inflicted by non-state agents is unjust for principled non-contingent
reasons. A familiar argument along these lines maintains that punishment
is designed to deter crimes, but that procedural considerations require that
the severity of punishment be determined on the basis of a democratic
deliberative process. It is thus unjust to inflict sanctions (even if these
sanctions are "deserved" or produce efficient incentives) unless certain
procedural preconditions are satisfied. These procedural preconditions
require (at least under normal circumstances) the agency of the state.
Another version of this type of justifications asserts that punishment is
inherently a prerogative of the victim. The infliction of sanctions by the
state is justified only when victims consent to transfer their power to
inflict sanctions to the state. State-inflicted sanctions are thus just because
the power to inflict sanctions was voluntarily transferred to the state by its
citizens. In some passages of his famous discussion of punishment, John
Locke argues in this vein that the consent of the governed to delegate their
powers to punish is a necessary procedural requirement.18
The third type of justifications, the state-centered justifications for
criminal sanctions, takes a more radical route and maintains that stateinflicted sanctions are fundamentally different from sanctions imposed by
other agents. Although privately-inflicted sanctions may be desirable for
various reasons, they are desirable for different reasons than state-inflicted
sanctions. A useful analogy illustrating the nature of state-centered
justifications is the blood feud. In a blood feud it is not the mere act of
killing that counts; it is rather the performance of the killing by the
appropriate agent, i.e., by a (male) member of the victim’s family that
18

John Locke, The Second Treatise, supra note 8 87.
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counts. It is clear that in the bible it is only a specific member of the
victim’s family who had the right and responsibility to kill the slayer with
impunity.19 The agent killing the murderer in a blood feud is not perceived
as a means to perform the (allegedly just) act of killing; instead it is the act
of killing which provides an opportunity for the appropriate agent to
redress the injustice. A killing not performed by the appropriate agent does
not therefore constitute blood feud and cannot redress the injustice.20
Joel Feinberg’s theory of punishment is an example of a state-centered
justification. Under his famous formulation of the expressive theory of
punishment: “punishment is a conventional device for the expression of
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval
and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of
those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”21 This function can
only be performed by the state since “punishment expresses the
judgment…of the community that what the criminal did was wrong.”22 In
contemporary societies it is the state (and perhaps the state alone) that is
understood to speak in the name of the community. Punishment of
criminals performed by agents other than the state may of course deter
wrongdoers, satisfy retributivist concerns and serve other important
functions, but it does not have the same symbolic expressive significance
that Feinberg believes punishment ought to have.

19

See, e.g., Pamela Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World 24 (Cambridge University
Press, 2005).

20

This implies that even if blood feud may serve some of the functions that in our society
are served by punishment, e.g., desert or deterrence, there are fundamental differences
between these practices. Punishment involves suffering of the person who perpetrated the
crime. Blood feud involves inflicting death by a relative of the victim. In punishment, it is
the agency of the perpetrator of the crime that counts while in blood feud, it is the agency
of the person who inflicts the sanction that counts.

21

See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment in A Reader on
Punishment 74 (ed. R.A. Duff and David Garland, Oxford University Press, 1994).

22

Id at 76. Of course one could argue that a private sanction inflicted by individuals in
the community may even better express the community’s sentiments. It is not however
my aim here to defend the position that the state speaks “in the name of the community,”
but only to point out theorists who defend state-centered justifications for criminal
sanctions.
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Another influential example of a state-centered justification for stateinflicted sanctions can be traced back to Kant’s discussion of punishment
in the Metaphysics of Morals:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of
all its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to
separate and disperse throughout the world), the last murderer
remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that
each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt
does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this
punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as
collaborators in this public violation of justice.23
Under one plausible interpretation, Kant believes that the last murderer
has to be executed before the dispersion of the society.24 An attempt to
remedy the great injustice of not executing the murderer before the
dispersion of the society could thus not be remedied by killing him after
the dispersion of the society. For this would constitute a private act of
killing rather than a public act of execution and, unlike a public execution,
a private killing could not be done in the name of the people as a
collectivity. The practice of state-inflicted executions of murderers is thus
fundamentally different from a practice where murders are killed by nonstate agents. It is the difference in the identity of the agent which explains
why the former act is required by justice, while the latter is prohibited.

23

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 106 (Cambridge University Press,
Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, 1996).

24

This conclusion follows from the interpretation given to this section by Thomas Hill.
Hill believes that Kant’s theory of punishment is a mixed theory. Establishing the
practice of punishing wrongdoers is designed to protect freedom rather than to inflict
deserved sanctions. Once this scheme is established, state officials are required to impose
sanctions as prescribed by law, without deviating for pragmatic reasons. This section is
understood by Hill to highlight the officials’ duty to apply the law, i.e., to “reaffirm the
idea that those responsible for enforcing the law must apply the legally prescribed
sanctions without concern for whether punishment has any deterrent value in the
particular case.” See Hill, supra note 12 at 433. After the dispersion of the state there are
no officials who are charged with the responsibility of imposing sanctions prescribed by
law. Hence the infliction of suffering cannot be justified as a part of the faithful
fulfillment of the officials’ duties.
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Note that the advocates of state-centered justifications for criminal
punishments need not deny that some of the desirable byproducts of
criminal punishments (e.g., deterring crimes, or inflicting deserved
sufferings on the guilty) can be achieved by sanctions inflicted by nonstate agents. In order to be classified as an advocate of a state-centered
justification for criminal sanctions, it is sufficient to maintain that stateinflicted criminal sanctions have some central functions which cannot, in
principle, be realized by non-state agents.
The proposed classification of justifications of state-inflicted sanctions
helps in providing a better understanding of the controversy identified by
Fletcher. Some theorists uphold an instrumentalist view of state-inflicted
sanctions. In their view, a complete justification of the practice of criminal
punishment can be provided without reference to the agency of the state;
the state being merely a convenient agent for performing a task which can
be fully justified independently of the agency of the state. In contrast,
advocates of both the normative preconditions justification and the statecentered justification argue that criminal sanctions cannot be justified
without reference to the agency of the state. Criminal sanctions are
political in essence; their understanding presupposes an understanding of
the distinctive features of the state.

III. IN DEFENSE OF A STATE-CENTERED
JUSTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
Section II investigated three types of justifications of state-inflicted
criminal sanctions: instrumental justifications, normative preconditions
justifications and state-centered justifications. In this section, I argue that
state-centered justifications provide a more accurate account of our pretheoretical intuitions. Furthermore, I develop a sub-class of state-centered
justifications which I call “integrationist justifications” for state-inflicted
criminal sanctions. Under an integrationist justification, the successful
exercise of the power to inflict sanctions depends upon a complex
normative framework that comprises other state duties and powers. The
power to inflict criminal sanctions is inextricably linked with the creation
of prohibitions whose violations call for punitive measures. The power to
inflict sanctions has to be a state power because of the interdependence
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between the state’s power to create prohibitions and the power to inflict
sanctions triggered by violating these prohibitions.
Sub-section A introduces the idea of an integrationist justification through
the example of parent-children relationships. Sub-section B argues that an
integrationist justification for the state’s power to inflict criminal sanctions
is consistent with some deeply seated pre-theoretical convictions. Then it
develops an integrationist justification for state-inflicted criminal
sanctions.
A. The Parental Power to Inflict Sanctions: An Integrationist Justification

This section explores the justification for parentally-inflicted sanctions. In
particular it investigates the case for a “parent-centered” justification of
punishment inflicted on children. It is important however to concede at the
outset that this section is not aimed at conclusively establishing the
soundness of a parent-centered justification. Instead, it aims to explore the
structure of such a justification in order to facilitate the construction of an
analogous argument in the political context.
A parent-centered justification of the punishment of children asserts that
parentally-inflicted sanctions realize goals or perform tasks that cannot be
successfully realized by non-parental agents. There is thus a fundamental
difference between parentally-inflicted punishment and suffering inflicted
on children by other agents (or natural forces). The successful infliction of
punishments (or at least some types of punishments) hinges upon the
identity of the agent who performs it.
To examine the plausibility of this justification compare it with an
instrumental justification. At the center of such a justification would be the
idea that punishing children is conducive to their education and promotes
their well-being. Having established the desirability of inflicting sanctions,
an instrumental justification would then point to the fact that parents
typically love their children and are deeply interested their future wellbeing. Because of this a parent is more likely than other agents to punish a
child under circumstances in which the punishment contributes to the
child's well-being.
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This argument has some intuitive force and yet it fails to explain
fundamental intuitions concerning parenthood. According to a deeply held
belief, the power to inflict sanctions belongs “naturally” to parents and
cannot be transferred to a third party without undermining the very
institution of parenthood. In contrast to the instrumentalist justification,
the parent-centered justification which sees parenthood as necessary for
the successful infliction of sanctions can better account for this conviction.
Depriving the parents of the power to inflict sanctions on their children
and granting such a power to another agent would in effect transform that
other agent into a quasi-parent and would deprive the “parent” of his or
her natural parental responsibilities.25 Success in performing the parental
tasks presupposes exercising the power to inflict sanctions and vice versa.
This view does not imply that one cannot think of new institutional
arrangements under which the power to inflict sanctions would be shifted.
Under one possible institutional arrangement, the community is
responsible for raising children and every adult person has the power to
inflict sanctions on them. By becoming quasi-parents members of the
community take upon themselves new responsibilities and are granted new
powers (other than the power to inflict sanctions). This transfer of the
power to inflict sanctions from the "parents" to all adult members of the
community can thus be seen as a partial transfer of parenthood from the
“parents” to the community, and this will have far-reaching consequences.
Under the alternative arrangement I envision, the transfer of power must
include powers other than the power to inflict sanctions. Furthermore,
such a view does not imply that parents have an exclusive power to punish
their children. The integrationist justification could grant parents the
exclusive power to punish children for certain types of misbehavior but
25

To establish the alleged naturalness of parenthood think of a community in which
parents are barred from inflicting sanctions on their children and the power to inflict
sanctions is assigned to the parents' closest neighbors. Such a practice could be justified
on the grounds that loving parents may be too soft and consequently that the sanctions
they are likely to inflict on their children are too lenient. Neighbors, under this view, are
less partial and more objective in their judgments concerning punishment. I suspect many
would reject such a proposal as preposterous not merely because of the flaws in its
factual premises. The resistance to such a proposal rests on the conviction that the power
to punish "belongs" to the parents or that it is "natural" that parents are the ones who have
the power to inflict sanctions and that stripping parents of their power to punish should be
equated with stripping parents of parenthood.
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there is nothing in principle that prevents giving others the power to
punish for other types of misbehavior. Last, such a justification does not
preclude the possibility that the parents’ powers to punish be constrained
by the state in order to prevent abuse of that power, namely the infliction
of punishment which does not serve the purposes for which the power was
granted in the first place.
Can the conviction that the power to inflict sanctions naturally “belongs”
to the parents be justified? Why should not the power to inflict sanctions
be assigned to the agent who is most likely to exercise it properly? After
all sanctions inflicted on children are designed to educate them and, while
it is possible that parents are more likely to exercise this power in a way
which is conducive to this purpose, there is nothing which, in principle,
precludes the possibility that other agents would be more successful at this
task.
One plausible defense of a parent-centered justification for granting
parents the power to inflict sanctions is an integrationist defense. Under
such a justification, parental duties and powers cannot be understood in
isolation. Rather the powers exercised in punishing a child are affected by
and, in turn, reflect on other parental duties and vice versa. The
sentiments, convictions and judgments acquired in the course of inflicting
sanctions are conducive to the fulfillment of other parental duties and the
sentiments, convictions and judgments acquired in the course of fulfilling
other parental duties are conducive to the rightful infliction of sanctions. It
seems for instance that punishment of children inculcates in parents
awareness that the children’s well-being ought not to be equated with their
immediate short-term pleasures. The parents’ power to punish children is
conducive to a better appreciation of what the well-being of their children
consists of.
The conviction that the power to inflict sanctions "naturally belongs" to
parents can now be seen as founded on the interrelations between different
parental duties and powers. The power to inflict sanctions is “natural” to
parenthood because having such a power and/or exercising it is conducive
to the emergence of certain sentiments, to the maintenance of practices
and to the formation of beliefs and judgments which are conducive to
parenthood. Under this view, one must resist the temptation to look at
punishment simply as a means of fulfilling an important task and then go
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in search for the agent who is the most capable of performing this task.
Instead, one ought to regard parenthood as an important social institution
for the sake of which one ought to assign tasks that contribute to the
overall success of this institution. The appropriateness of sanctions and
their success in achieving their goals thus depends on their being
integrated with other aspects of parenthood.26 Parenthood and in particular
the emotional and deliberative preconditions for being a good parent are
thus the key to the understanding of punishment.
Here we have the outline of a justification for giving parents the power to
punish their children. Under this justification, assigning the power to
inflict sanctions to parents is not justified (or, at least, not primarily)
justified on the grounds that the parents are the most capable of inflicting
it successfully, but on the grounds that the power to inflict sanctions
serves parenthood. Given that the institution of parenthood is a desirable
institution and as such worth maintaining, it follows that one has reasons
to create a normative framework necessary for parenthood and to assign
the power to inflict sanctions to the parents.
To sum up, the integrationist justification for assigning parents the power
to inflict sanctions analyzes parenthood in its totality as a complex relation
which involves the fulfillment of duties and the exercise of powers. The
appropriateness of assigning these duties and powers to an agent ought not
to be judged separately. Instead, a complete account of parenthood ought
to be based on an understanding of the mutual interrelations between these
different powers and duties.
B. An Integrationist Justification for State-Inflicted Sanctions

Can a similar integrationist justification be provided for state-inflicted
sanctions? Under such a justification, criminal punishment is not merely
an important task in search of an agent capable of performing it; instead
the infliction of criminal punishment is an integral part of successful
statehood in the same way that the infliction of sanctions on children is
26

The integrationist justification is hardly a novelty in the literature on parenthood. One
influential argument suggests that the power to command and the duty to care are
interrelated. See Saint Augustine, City of God Book XIX chapter 14 (Penguin Books,
2003).
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perceived by advocates of the integrationist justification as an integral part
of successful parenting. The power to inflict criminal sanctions on
wrongdoers is essential to the state because it is interrelated with other
powers and duties of the state such that stripping the state of this power
disrupts its proper functioning. The first sub-section points out some pretheoretical intuitions which support an integrationist justification. The
second sub-section develops an integrationist justification for state’s
power to punish.
i)

1. Intuitions Supporting an Integrationist Justification for StateInflicted Sanctions

Several intuitive observations support the conjecture that the state’s power
to inflict criminal sanctions is grounded in an integrationist justification.
The power to inflict criminal sanctions is a sphere of operation of the state
which is almost universally perceived to be basic and fundamental. It is
easy to conceive of a state that does not redistribute resources or one that
does not maintain a tort law system. To imagine a society without a
criminal law system or without a scheme of sanctions for the violation of
norms is regarded often as tantamount to imagining a stateless existence.
There are of course numerous other ways in which the state operates, but
most of these seem to be more peripheral to the state's existence than the
power to inflict sanctions for transgressions.
Furthermore, most people do not perceive privately-inflicted sanctions and
state-inflicted sanctions as interchangeable. A criminal conviction may
often give rise to (justified or unjustified) negative reactions on the part of
private individuals. These negative reactions may in turn lead to the
infliction of (justified or unjustified) privately-inflicted sanctions. There
may be some sound prudential or moral reasons not to socialize with a
person convicted of a crime. But privately-inflicted sanctions cannot
substitute wholly or in part for state-inflicted sanctions following a
criminal conviction. If criminal punishment could successfully be inflicted
by non-state agents, state-inflicted criminal sanctions should arguably, as a
matter of justice, be calculated in a way which takes into consideration the
private sufferings of the criminal (or, at least, the private sufferings
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resulting from privately-inflicted sanctions).27 Yet, while courts
sometimes take into account the private sufferings borne by the criminal,
they are not obliged to do so. The private sufferings of the guilty
(including private sufferings resulting from the infliction of privatelyinflicted sanctions) may lead courts to inflict a more lenient sentence out
of compassion, but such leniency is discretionary and many theorists have
opposed it.28 This indicates that state-inflicted sanctions are not typically
viewed as commensurate with private sanctions. Privately-inflicted
sanctions and state-inflicted sanctions are not merely two forms of
commensurate sufferings which are added to each other. A possible
explanation for the reluctance to conduct such a calculation is that private
sanctions are “not imposed by the state, and whatever is not imposed by
the state cannot be part of offender’s punishment.”29
Both of these observations can be easily explained within the framework
of a state-centered justification. In a state-centered justification, the power
to inflict criminal sanctions is understood to be essential to statehood such
that stripping the state of this power frustrates the functioning of the state
as such. The non-substitutability of privately-inflicted sanctions for stateinflicted sanctions also point to the fundamental role that the state as the
agent in charge of inflicting sanctions plays in justifying the infliction of
these sanctions. These considerations support a state-centered justification
of criminal sanctions. This leaves open, however, the question of whether
such a justification can be provided.
27

Law and economics theorists have often advocated such a position. In the context of
tort law, see, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal
Sanctions from Damages? 30 Journal of Legal Studies 401-422 (2001)

28

See, e.g., Richard Bierschbach Alex Stein, Overenforcement 93 Georgetown L.J. 1743,
1750-1752 (2005). Even theorists who support the substitutability of state-inflicted and
privately-inflicted sanctions concede that this is not the general view. See, e.g., Douglas
Husak, “Already Punished Enough” 18 Philosophical Topics 79 (1990). An interesting
indication to the reluctance to take into account sufferings resulting from privatelyinflicted sanctions can be found in German criminal law. Section 51 of the German
Criminal Code entitled “crediting” requires courts to deduct sanctions imposed by courts
for the same offense, but it does not indicate that privately-inflicted sanctions ought to be
deducted. The German criminal code differentiates sharply between state-inflicted
sanctions and privately-inflicted sanctions.
29

See Husak, id at 85. Husak himself however rejects this view.
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ii) 2. Why Only the State Can Inflict Criminal Sanctions?

Some opponents of privately-inflicted criminal sanctions argue that a
delegation of the power to inflict sanctions to private individuals raises
serious pragmatic concerns.30 I wish however to raise a principled
argument against such a delegation – an argument which suggest that even
if the pragmatic concerns can be overcome, such a delegation is
nonetheless impermissible.
The most fundamental task of the state is the task of governing justly. Just
governance requires the state to govern its citizens under constraints
dictated by justice. Just governance presupposes the guidance of behavior
and the issuing of prohibitions. Note that the integrationist justification
provided here is premised on the assumption that the state is justified in
issuing prohibitions and that the violation of these prohibitions justifiably
triggers the infliction of sanctions. The integrationist justification aims to
show that when these conditions are satisfied, the state and the state alone
ought to make determinations concerning the severity of these sanctions
and then inflict them. The state being the initiator of criminal prohibitions
cannot thus delegate the powers to determine the severity of the sanction
or to inflict it to private entities.
One unsuccessful attempt to develop an integrationist justification of statesanctions is that of Anthony Duff. In his view:
The criminal law declares certain kinds of conduct to be
wrong—to be criminal. But if the law, or the society in whose
name it speaks, is to mean what it thus says, it is committed to
censuring those who nonetheless engage in such conduct. To
remain silent in the fact of their crimes would be to

30

Pragmatic concerns were often raised against shaming penalties. There are many who
believe that shaming penalties are erratic and unreliable. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey,
Can Shaming Penalties Educate 65 University of Chicago L. Rev. 748-749 (1998).
Others have pointed out that the more criminals are detected, the lesser the effectiveness
of shaming penalties is. See Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma:
Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization (forthcoming in 36
Journal of Legal Studies).
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undermine—by implication to go back on—its declaration that
such conduct is wrong.31

Duff believes that the prohibitions enacted by the state have implications
beyond their mere ceremonial verbal declaration, namely, that the state is
wiling to censure behavior which conflicts with the prohibition. To remain
silent, i.e., to fail to inflict sanctions casts doubts on the sincerity and
seriousness of the moral commitment of the state and consequently
undermines its authority. Put differently the willingness to inflict sanctions
buttresses the state’s moral commitment to the norms it declares to be
obligatory. The power to issue prohibitions and the power to inflict
sanctions for their violation are thus closely interrelated. Assigning the
power to issue prohibitions without also assigning the power to inflict
sanctions undercut the state’s moral authority by casting doubts on its
sincerity and moral commitment.
Unfortunately this justification does not succeed. Failing to inflict
sanctions does not necessarily (or even typically) cast doubts on the
sincerity or the moral commitment of the state. To see why, think of the
traditional utilitarian reasoning concerning punishment. Utilitarians argue
that punishment is justified only when inflicting it maximizes utility. A
failure on the part of a utilitarian to inflict sanctions for wrongdoing when
the infliction of these sanctions does not contribute to the maximization of
utility does not indicate insincerity on the part of the utilitarian. On the
contrary, such a failure indicates a faithful adherence to utilitarianism.
Furthermore, if the state can be sure that the sanctions will be inflicted
privately, then a failure to inflict sanctions does not show a lack of moral
commitment on the part of the state. This is certainly the case when the
state sustains and reinforces the mechanisms for privately-inflicted
sanctions as the advocates of shaming penalties urge it to do. As long as
the state guarantees that sanctions will be inflicted either by its own
officials or by delegating the power to reliable non-state agents, the state
conveys serious commitment to the prohibitions it issues.
31

Duff, supra note 14 at 28.
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Let me provide a different integrationist argument. This argument is meant
to establish that criminal sanctions ought to be grounded in state’s
judgments concerning the wrongfulness of an act and the appropriateness
of the sanctions. Privately-inflicted sanctions, under this argument, are
grounded in the private judgments of those who inflict them. They sever
the link between the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the
act or the appropriateness of the sanctions and the infliction of the sanction
and, furthermore, I will show that, privately-inflicted sanctions are
impermissible for that reason. It is impermissible on the part of the state to
authorize private individuals to inflict suffering on the guilty.
To establish the impermissibility of privately-inflicted sanctions assume a
law-abiding citizen A, who is asked (or hired) by the state to inflict
sanctions on convicted offenders. The state asks A to ostracize persons
convicted of a particular offense. Upon being notified about the conviction
of person B for this offense, A considers whether she ought to participate
in the sentencing scheme by ostracizing B or limiting her social interaction
with B.
It seems that A’s decision to ostracize B could be based on three possible
reasons. Ostracizing B could be based: i) on A’s judgment that ostracizing
B is a way of fulfilling A’s civic obligations; it could be based ii) on A’s
judgment that B committed an offence and deserves to be punished and it
could be based iii) on A’s trust that the state made an accurate
determination concerning the wrongfulness of B’s behavior and the
appropriateness of the sanction. In the third case, A does not form an
independent judgment with respect to these issues. In each one of these
cases I will discuss two separate issues. First I will discuss the question of
whether ostracizing B can count as punishment and second I will discuss
whether it is permissible (either on the part of the private individual to
inflict the sanction or on the part of the state to authorize such an
infliction).
Ostracizing B as a way of fulfilling one’s civic duties is of course harmful
to B but it is not properly classified as a criminal punishment since it does
not presuppose a judgment on the part of A that B has committed a wrong.
Punishment, after all, involves the infliction of suffering grounded in a
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particular reason, namely that a wrong has been perpetrated.32 Inflicting
suffering as a means of fulfilling one’s civic duty does not presuppose a
judgment by A concerning the prior commission of a wrong on the part of
the criminal.
Is it permissible for A to inflict suffering on B in order to fulfill his or her
civic duty and to do it under circumstances in which A has not formed an
opinion concerning the wrongfulness of B’s behavior? To establish the
impermissibility of such an act think of the grievance which B can raise
against A. Most convincingly, B can argue that it is unjust on the part of A
to inflict a suffering without forming a judgment that B committed a
wrong. A’s assertion that he merely fulfills a civic duty implies that A is
willing to inflict this suffering irrespective of whether B has committed a
wrong. It seems evident that there can be no civic duty to inflict suffering
under these conditions.
Assume now that A ostracizes B because she formed the opinion that B
has committed a wrong and deserves to be punished. This is indeed a
punishment for wrongdoing but A’s judgment concerning the
wrongfulness of B’s behavior and the appropriateness of the sanction is a
private judgment on the part of A. The sanction does not reflect a
judgment on the part of the state concerning the severity of the offence or
the appropriateness of the sanction. The person inflicting the sanction may
of course happen to form an opinion on these matters identical to that of
the state. But this would be a happy coincidence and would not transform
the private infliction of suffering into a state punishment.
But is A’s infliction of suffering in this case impermissible? As long as
A’s judgment is a private one made by A on the basis of her own
judgment, it may be permissible. Yet, it is wrong on the part of the state to
approve of the infliction of the sanction under these circumstances. To
establish the impermissibility of the state’s support for A’s action, B could
simply argue that the state may not simply endorse A’s judgment
concerning the wrongfulness of B’s action. It would be wrong on the part
of the state to grant A’s private judgment greater weight than B’s private
32

All conventional definitions of punishment include reference to such a requirement.
See, e.g., Hart, supra note 4 pp. 4-5 (1968)
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judgment concerning the wrongfulness of B’s behavior. Instead the state
ought to make its own public judgment concerning the wrongfulness of
B’s action and its ramifications. B has a legitimate grievance if she is
subjected to A’s state-authorized private judgment and this grievance is
distinct from any grievance she may have in being subjected to an (unjust)
public judgment.
Assume finally that A ostracizes B not because she believes it is her civic
duty or because she forms an independent judgment concerning the
wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness of the sanction. Instead, A
inflicts the sanction because she trusts the state’s judgment on these
matters. It seems that sanctions inflicted on the basis of such trust are
grounded in the state’s own judgments and can thus be regarded as
criminal sanctions proper. The trustworthy citizen does not form an
independent judgment concerning the wrongfulness of the action or the
appropriateness of the sanction determined by the state. She simply
functions as an instrument for realizing the state’s own judgments.
But, it is doubtful whether such trust could be ever justified. If such trust
could be justified, the citizen would be exempted from responsibility for
the infliction of an inappropriate sanction. The moral responsibility for
inflicting such a sanction would rest with the state. Such an exemption
from moral responsibility is sometimes justified with respect to state
officials such as judges, prison guards or perhaps even executioners.
Citizens however are different. They cannot abdicate their responsibility
when suffering is inflicted.
Consider an example of a person who opposes capital punishment. Such a
person, no doubt, should resist the state’s invitation to execute an offender
on the grounds that he believes that capital punishment is not an
appropriate sanction. A private person who accepts the state’s invitation
and inflicts such a sanction cannot escape moral responsibility by pointing
out that the state asked him to do so.
Inflicting a sanction under these circumstances exposes the perpetrator of
the crime to a serious risk. Judgments concerning the appropriateness of
sanctions for wrongdoing are highly contestable. A citizen who is asked
by the state to inflict sufferings on a criminal should not rely on the state’s
judgments when the consequences are so grave. The citizen is required in
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this situation to form a judgment concerning the appropriateness of the
sanction she is to inflict. If she fails to do so and, if, as a result of her
unquestioning conformity with the state’s judgments, she inflicts an
inappropriate sanction, she is accountable for her failure. Inflicting the
sanction in these circumstances should therefore to be regarded as a
private act on the part of the citizen founded on the citizen’s own
judgment that the sufferings inflicted are appropriate. Failing to form an
independent opinion concerning the appropriateness of the sanction does
not transform the act from a private into a public act and does not turn it
into a state sanction.
The status of a citizen who is called upon by the state to inflict sanctions
thus differs from the status of an official. A judge, a prison guard or even
an executioner is often entitled or obligated to faithfully execute the state’s
sentencing decisions. Such a duty to execute the state’s sentencing
decisions is not boundless but it is much broader than the duties borne by a
citizen. Demarcating the boundary between citizens and officials is not
always easy, I admit, but it is this line which explains the difference in the
moral responsibility of a judge or a prison guard on the one hand and of a
citizen who is asked by the state to participate in the infliction of
privately-inflicted sanctioning on the other. The former is an official who
is typically entitled or even required to perform this task irrespective of his
private convictions concerning the appropriateness of the sanction; the
latter bears moral responsibility for what she does irrespective of whether
she follows the state’s sentencing guidelines.
To conclude, the integrationist argument maintains that the power to issue
prohibitions and the powers to make determinations concerning the
severity of the sanctions and to inflict them are inextricably interrelated. It
is impermissible on the part of individuals to inflict sanctions without
forming an independent judgment with respect to the wrongfulness of the
action and the appropriateness of the sanctions. If they form such a
judgment it is impermissible for the state to endorse that judgment. To the
extent that criminal sanctions are justified, they therefore have to be
inflicted by the same agent who creates the prohibitions. The suffering
inflicted by privately-inflicted sanctions is grounded in a private judgment
concerning the wrongfulness of the act or the appropriateness of the
sanction. By privatizing the infliction of the sanction, the state effectively
transfers not merely the “technical” power to execute the sanction. Instead,
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it strips itself of the power to make binding determinations concerning the
wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness of the sanction. These
determinations should instead be attributed to the individual who inflicts
the sanction rather than to the state. By delegating this power to private
individuals, the state in effect severs the link between the prohibitions it
issues and the suffering inflicted on the offender. The individual who
inflicts punishment on the basis of reasons he has acquired from the state
acts on what she has come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient
basis for action. The contribution to the genesis of his action made by the
state’s invitation to participate in the infliction of sanctions is, so to speak,
superseded by the agent’s own judgment.33 The suffering of the criminal is
therefore a “private” suffering – a suffering founded on a citizen’s
judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness
of the sanction.
The infliction of state-initiated privately-inflicted sanctions is
impermissible. It is impermissible on the part of a citizen to inflict
sanctions without forming an independent judgment concerning the
wrongfulness of the alleged wrongful act. When such a private judgment
has been formed, it is impermissible on the part of the state to approve of
the infliction of the punishment since such an approval gives undue weight
to the private moral convictions of the individual who inflicts the sanction.
Furthermore, the belief that the sanctions for wrongdoing should reflect
the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act is quite
fundamental to what we think of as a legal system. Instituting privatelyinflicted sanctions would thus challenge fundamental assumptions of the
legal system. Under these assumptions criminal sanctions ought to be
grounded in societal judgments generated by social and political
deliberation.
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1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 204, 212 (1972).
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IV. CODA: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY
PUNITIVE PRACTICES
Some of the most heated contemporary controversies in criminal law are
grounded in conflicting intuitions concerning the role of the state. This
section investigates two contemporary debates: the extensive use of
shaming penalties and private prisons. These two issues involve two
different forms of privatization. Shaming penalties privatize both the
determination of the severity of the sanction and the infliction of the
sanction. The agents who shame select the sanctions they wish to inflict
(within the boundaries of the law) and they are also in charge of inflicting
these sanctions. In contrast, the corporations operating private prisons
inflict sanctions whose severity is determined by the state.
A. Shaming Penalties

Stigmatization imposes costs on offenders by identifying them and
disseminating information about them. This in turn generates social and
professional isolation and alienation from the rest of society. Potential
wrongdoers are deterred because other individuals, law-abiding
individuals in particular, might limit their social or professional interaction
with them as a result of their conviction. Shaming penalties presuppose the
active cooperation of private individuals. Such cooperation is needed
because effective stigmatization requires that individuals distance
themselves from the offenders and isolate them personally or
professionally.
This aspect of shaming penalties was diagnosed and condemned in James
Whitman’s vigorous attack on shaming penalties:
However much prisons may have declined into chaos, they are
in principle controllable. However monstrous they may have
become, we all agree that the state has the duty to manage
them: to establish rules, to call review boards, to answer
complaints in court. None of that apparatus exists to control the
enforcement of shame. This means that though courts may
wish to abandon the prison system and switch to a system of
shaming, they must not be permitted to do so. Doing so means
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abandoning their obligation to maintain a monopoly of the
means of power—it means abandoning their duty to be
imposers of measured punishment.34
Whitman’s opposition to shame penalties is motivated by the sense that
the state ought to maintain the exclusive power to punish irrespective of
any instrumental considerations. In Whitman’s view a delegation of this
power to the community deprives the criminal of his dignity irrespective
of the severity of the sanctions that the community chooses to inflict on
him. Whitman thus argues that the state’s control over the infliction of
sanctions is grounded in the state’s duty to be “the imposers of measured
punishment.”35
Yet, Whitman fails to provide reasons for his assertion that only the state
ought to control the infliction of sanctions. Advocates of shaming
penalties do not have to accept Whitman’s dogmatic view that delegating
the power to inflict sanctions means abandoning the state’s “obligation to
maintain a monopoly of the means of power—it means abandoning their
duty to be imposers of measured punishment.” Such an advocate could
question whether by introducing shaming penalties the state indeed
abandons its monopoly on power and whether it has an obligation to
maintain such a monopoly in the first place.
The integrationist justification may provide the missing rationale for
Whitman’s powerful opposition to shaming penalties. Shaming penalties,
as currently practiced in the US, constitute a highly deficient privatelyinflicted scheme of sanctions. Shaming penalties are often inflicted for the
wrong reasons. Individuals who inflict shaming penalties are often
instrumentally-motivated.36 In some cases the hostile reactions take place
when the commission of the offence is indicative that the goods or
services that are likely to be provided by an offender are inferior to those
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See James Q. Whitman, What is wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions? 107 Yale
L.J. 1055, 1091 (1998).
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Whitman, id 1091.
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that are likely to be provided by non-offenders.37 In such cases the
suffering inflicted on the criminal is merely a price reflecting the inferior
quality of the goods or services rather than a genuinely punitive measure.
But even when ostracizing the offender is based on a judgment that the
offender has committed a wrong, this judgment is a private judgment on
the part of those who ostracize, and it would thus be wrong for the state to
grant its approval to this judgment; more specifically, it would be
tantamount to granting undue weight to the judgment of the individual or
private entity who inflicts the penalty.
B. Private Prisons

The emergence of private prisons has sparked a heated debate. For the
most part this debate focuses on the relative efficiency of private prisons
as compared to their publicly run counterpart.38 Yet some critics of private
prisons challenge the legitimacy of these prisons. These critics share the
view that the act of incarceration is “intrinsically governmental in nature”
and that, as a consequence, a recourse to private prisons is inappropriate
regardless of the relative efficiency of this penal form.39 An example can
be found in Michael Walzer’s work:
Police and prison guards are our representatives, whose
activities we have authorized. The policeman’s uniform
represents his representative character. When he puts his
uniform he strips himself bare, so to speak, of his private
opinions and motivations. Ideally, at least, he is equally
energetic in enforcing laws that he does and does not like and
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See Richard Posner, and Eric Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special
Reference to Sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics 19(3): 369, 371
(1999).
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he treats all citizens, and all criminals, in the same way,
whatever his personal prejudices.40
Walzer further argues that the profit motive “exposes the prisoners to
private or corporate purposes, and it sets them at some distance from the
protection of the law.”41 Walzer thus worries that private prisons are
operated by agents who are not motivated by the right sort of reasons. His
concern is that it is unjust to expose prisoners to treatment governed by
profit considerations.
The main argument of this paper leads to the conclusion that even if the
running of private prisons was not dominated by profit-motives, prisons
cannot in principle be operated by private entities. These entities have a
duty to make independent judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the
act and the severity of the sanctions and those judgments are never
judgments which can justify the infliction of state-approved privatelyinflicted sanctions.
The examples of shaming penalties and private prisons demonstrate that
the debates concerning the justification of state-inflicted sanctions are not
merely theoretical. Even if a solely privately-inflicted scheme of sanctions
is not a realistic option, there are currently reforms or reform proposals to
grant private individuals the power to inflict sanctions for wrongdoing.
These proposals have often been initiated and discussed by economists,
sociologists and lawyers. This paper establishes that philosophical
considerations provide reasons to oppose schemes of privately-inflicted
sanctions.
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